Introduction
There is a common perception that the gains from trade are larger than what quantitative general-equilibrium models of trade can explain. A recurring goal in the trade literature has been to …nd new channels through which such models could generate larger gains from trade.
A prominent example is Romer (1994) , where trade allows for the consumption of a higher variety of goods, and this generates additional bene…ts not included in standard calculations.
Romer's argument is that, in the presence of …xed marketing or distribution costs, a su¢ ciently high tari¤ may imply not just lower imports, but no imports at all of a good. The result would be less variety in available consumer goods and less availability of specialized equipment and intermediate goods.
We start in section 2 by showing that the connection postulated by Romer between trade liberalization and increasing variety is present in the data by focusing on the experience of Costa Rica from 1986 to 1992. During this period, the average tari¤ on consumer (intermediate) goods fell from 48.8% to 22.5% (11.2% to 10%) and the variety of consumer (intermediate) goods imported increased by 25.6% (14.7%). Romer performed a numerical exercise to show that the welfare losses arising from reduced variety may be an order of magnitude larger than those associated with the standard trade analysis (the Harberger Triangles). In section 3 we use our Costa Rican data to evaluate this result by applying a method introduced by Feenstra (1994) to compute the gains from increased imported variety. For consumer goods we …nd gains of around 0.3% in spite of the much larger increase in variety, while for intermediate goods we
…nd no gains at all. The relatively low welfare gains arise because of strong heterogeneity across imported goods, which implies that, upon trade liberalization, the new varieties are imported in small quantities and hence contribute little to welfare. We refer to this e¤ect, not taken into account by Romer (1994) nor some of his followers (Rutherford and Tarr, 2002) , as the e¤ect of "curvature" in weakening the variety gains from trade. In section 4 we relate this result to recent models of …rm-level heterogeneity and derive a simple formula that shows the e¤ect of curvature.
The reader may …nd it surprising that we …nd small variety gains from trade liberalization in Costa Rica given that Broda and Weinstein (2006) …nd large gains from imported variety for the U.S. But the two exercises are very di¤erent. Broda and Weinstein (2006) quantify the gains from the introduction of new varieties in the rest of the world that are eventually imported into the United States. This is very di¤erent from the e¤ects of trade liberalization because, whereas an expansion of imported variety responding to trade liberalization entails consuming less desirable varieties (that's why they weren't imported before), an expansion of imported variety in time is more likely to be associated with the introduction of important (infra-marginal) varieties abroad which are more likely to contribute signi…cantly to welfare.
These results do no take into account the e¤ect of trade liberalization on domestic variety.
But it seems reasonable to think that an increase in import competition would cause a decline in domestic variety as domestic …rms exit. In fact, the evidence reveals that trade liberalization leads to exit by domestic …rms (Tybout, 2003 More generally, we …nd that the real wage is ultimately dependent on the ratio of imports to total expenditure with an elasticity that is the same across a range of models. This result is also relevant in relation to the notion that trade leads to a reallocation of economic activity towards …rms with higher productivity (Melitz, 2003 , Bernard et. al., 2003 , and that this "provides a non-traditional source of welfare gains from trade" (Bernard et. al., 2007 -JEP paper) . We argue that, conditional on the estimated elasticities of trade with respect to trade costs, the implications of models with increasing returns, endogenous variety, free or restricted entry, and heterogeneity across …rms have exactly the same implications for welfare gains from trade liberalization as traditional models. 2 In our view, the contribution of the new trade models is not to provide new channels for gains from trade, but rather to explain the levels and microfoundations of trade that we observe. Our sample is bracketed by 1986 and 1992 since Costa Rica used di¤erent product classi…cation systems before and after these years.
Variety and Tari¤s in Costa Rica
We take country of origin as the demarcation of a variety (i.e., cars from the US are a di¤erent variety than cars from Germany or Japan) and think of total variety for a good as the number of countries from which there were imports in a product category. 3 (The model we present in Section 5 interprets variety in the more traditional sense of monopolistic competition and product di¤erentiation, where variety corresponds to the number of …rms that sell in a market.) Of course, these aggregate trends do not establish that tari¤ reduction, as opposed to some other factor (such as income and population growth), caused the increases observed in variety and import shares. Evidence that variety increased in product-years with bigger tari¤ reductions would be more compelling. Before examining the micro evidence on tari¤s and variety, however, it is useful to examine the underlying premise that greater market size boosts variety, as implied by …xed costs of importing a given product from a given country. Table 2 bigger market has 0.26% more variety on average (standard errors around 0.004%). The R 20 s indicate that almost half the variation in variety across products is associated with market size.
Instead of larger markets pulling in more varieties due to …xed costs, an alternative intepretation of this result is that some product categories are arbitrarily broader than others. Exogenously larger categories could include more countries just because they are more aggregated. To see if the results owe entirely to cross-sectional variation in product size, we regressed variety on size controlling for product dummies. These results are also reported in Table 2 . The size of the elasticity is roughly halved to 0.12, but it remains economically and statistically signi…cant (standard errors around 0.006). 5 The fact that the elasticity of variety with respect to market size is well below one, however, implies either that …xed costs are increasing in market size (albeit less than proportionately) or ever-less-important varieties are imported by bigger markets.
Measuring market size as country GDP, Hummels and Klenow (2002) similarly found a strong relationship between market size and import variety. For 6-digit categories they found that larger economies imported proportionately more, and a doubling of importer size was associated with importing from about 28% more countries. As within Costa Rica, bigger markets seemed to import "smaller" varieties, as the new varieties accounted for only 19% of the additional imports of larger economies. Similarly, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2007), henceforth EKK, document that more French …rms (including those that have small sales in 5 Measuring market size as country GDP, Hummels and Klenow (2002) similarly found a strong relationship between market size and import variety. They looked at a set of 59 countries importing from 115 countries across 5,000 6-digit categories in 1995. Larger economies imported proportionately more, and a doubling of importer size was associated with importing from about 28% more countries within 6-digit categories. As within Costa Rica, bigger markets seemed to import "smaller" varieties, as the new varieties accounted for only 19% of the additional imports of larger economies.
France) export to larger economies, consistent with models with …xed costs of entry and with the idea that larger economies pull in less valuable varieties on the margin.
With some con…dence that market size a¤ects variety, we examined whether products with falling tari¤s see rising variety. Our identifying assumption is that product di¤erences in tari¤ changes are exogenous. Table 3 presents the results from regressing the natural log of variety on the natural log of the gross tari¤ rate. Including year and product dummies, we …nd an economically and statistically signi…cant negative association between variety and tari¤s, with a 1% higher tari¤ rate going along with 0.82% less consumer import variety and 0.29% less intermediate import variety (standard errors around 0.10%). Consistent with the hypothesis that higher tari¤s reduce variety by shrinking the market, Table 3 also reports that a 1% higher tari¤ lower total imports by 1.83% in consumer product categories and 0.54% in intermediate categories (standard errors of 0.29%).
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The association between available varieties and trade has been studied for other trade liberalization episodes. Kehoe and Ruhl (2003) 2006) …nds that while the total number of 6-digit (Harmonized-System) varieties that were imported by the U.S. from Mexico increases substantially with NAFTA (at least 30% depending on di¤erent de…nitions) the contribution of these goods to new trade is roughly 5%. This is also consistent with the …ndings of Eaton, Eslava, Kugler and Tybout (2007) for Colombian …rms.
They …nd that …rms that were not exporting the previous year into an destination market have typically very small sales there. Feenstra (1994) shows how to adjust the standard import price index for changing variety, including our case where marginal varieties appear less important than inframarginal ones. We refer to this adjustment as the Feenstra Ratio and denote it by F , with
Variety Gains in Costa Rica
Here v i are imports from country-product pair i in 1986 and is the set of country-product pairs imported in 1986, and the corresponding values with primes refer to 1992. access to cars from Japan, the U.S., and Germany.
The role of curvature
Consider a continuum of foreign varieties indexed by s and ordered in terms of decreasing quality or increasing marginal cost. With CES preferences and an elasticity of substitution > 1, there will be some n such that all varieties s 2 [0; n] are imported. This n will be lower than total foreign variety if importing entails a …xed cost. Consider an increase in imported variety from n to n 0 . The Feenstra Ratio in this case would be
Taking the log derivative of this with respect to n 0 we see that
The …rst term is the standard elasticity of welfare with respect to variety (love of variety) under CES preferences. The second is an adjustment for "curvature." A low value for this term implies that marginal varieties have either low quality or preference parameters, or a high international price, so the gains from increased variety are smaller.
A nice expression for this curvature adjustment can be obtained if we assume that the preference parameter, quality, or productivity is distributed Pareto. Under the productivity interpretation and with monopolistic competition, domestic prices of foreign varieties will be proportional to the inverse of productivity, , and v(s) will be proportional to (s) 1 , v(s) = A (s) 1 for some A > 0. Assume that there is a continuum of goods with exogenous measure M whose international price is drawn from a Pareto distribution, so that Pr( < e ) = G( e ) 1 (b= e ) for e b > 0. We assume that > 1. Note for future reference that an increase in implies less dispersion, in that more and more of the productivities are closer to the minimum b. If the …xed importing cost is the same across varieties, then pro…ts will be increasing in productivity ,and there will be a such that all inputs with > are imported. Imported variety is then n = M Pr( > ) and hence
Plugging into (1) we get:
Note that high curvature (low ) decreases the impact of love of variety.
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As mentioned in section 2, in Costa Rica the mean (weighted) variety for consumer goods went from 19.1 in 1986 to 24 in 1992, a increase of 25:6%. Given the result in the previous section that the Feenstra Ratio for this period is 0:997 (a welfare gain of 0:3% thanks to increased variety for = 6), we have that 0:256 " = 0:003. Using the expression in (2) for " and = 6, this implies that = 5:3.
For comparison, EKK use data on exports and domestic sales by French …rms to estimate that =( 1) = 1:5. If = 6 this means = 7:5, just a bit lower than the central value for (i.e., = 8) in Eaton and Kortum (2002) . The Costa Rican experience suggests somewhat higher curvature than this. This di¤erence matters for the welfare implications of the observed increase in variety in Costa Rica. If instead of = 5:3 we used the lower curvature associated with = 7:5, then " = 0:067, and the variety gains would be 1:7% rather than our 0:3%. Of course, this di¤erence could be due to the fact that in the Costa Rican data we are interpreting variety with country of origin, whereas in EKK variety is associated with the number of …rms that serve a particular market.
Endogenous Domestic Variety and Free Entry
The previous discussion has taken foreign variety to be exogenous and simply performed a imports, all major quantitative models of trade deliver the same gains.
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As above, there is a continuum of goods and preferences are CES with an elasticity of substitution > 1. We denote the exporting country by i and the importing country by j, where i; j = 1; :::; N . Given a measure of L j representative consumers in country j, the demand for a …rm with productivity from country i charging a price p ij ( ) in country j is
where w j is the wage and P j is the price index.
10 Each …rm must pay a …xed cost (in terms of labor in the destination country) to enter a particular market that varies across country pairs, f ij , and also incurs iceberg transportation costs ij > 1 with 8 Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2007) study the optimal trade policy in a setting where domestic and foreign variety are endogenous for the case of a small country. 9 One drawback of the model we present here is that we treat tari¤s as transportation costs, meaning that we don't deal with the way in which the associated revenues feed back into the demand for goods. For the points we make here, however, this is not problematic. For welfare analysis modelling tari¤s explicitly is essential (see Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare, 2007) . 10 The price index is P j , where
) is the distribution of productivities of …rms originating from country i conditional on selling to country j and M ij is the measure of …rms from country i selling to country j. ii = 1. Firms from i with ij will export to market j. The cut-o¤ productivities ij are determined by equating maximum pro…ts to zero. This yields
Firms have to pay a …xed entry cost, f e , in order to enter the market and draw a productivity realization. New entrants draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution, as above. 11 If a …rm gets a productivity draw below ii , it exits immediately without operating. Thus, because of free entry, in equilibrium, expected pro…ts of a …rm must equal to entry costs. 12 In other words, the product of the probability of getting a productivity draw above ii and the average pro…ts must equal the entry cost. The free entry condition together with the labor market clearing condition implies that the equilibrium number of …rms producing in country i is
Notice that total export sales from country i to j are:
average sales of operating …rms .
De…ne the fraction of total income of country j spent on goods from country i by ij . Using the de…nition of total sales from i to j and equation (4) we have:
It is quite remarkable that, even with free entry, the equation determining market shares, (6), turns out to be quite similar to the one introduced by Eaton and Kortum (2002) . In particular, market share appears to be changing in the same elasticity with respect to the cost factors, ij and w i . In fact, it is worth noticing that this expression is identical to that of Chaney (2007), who does not assume free entry, but a predetermined number of potential suppliers.
13
Using equation (5) and the de…nition of ij that implies T ij = ij w j L j , it follows that the measure of …rms from country i selling to j, M ij , can be written as:
Thus, total varieties o¤ered in country j are given by:
This is a generalization of the Baldwin and Forslid (2004) result. In particular, increasing any j (trade liberalization) has an anti-variety e¤ect i¤ f j > f jj , 8 . 14 Intuitively, if f j > f jj then the marginal variety from country entails a lower price than the marginal domestic variety, so for each new foreign variety more than one domestic variety is displaced.
In this class of models, welfare for each representative consumer is given by C j = w j =P j ,which does not depend on the assumption of free entry. Using (3) and (6) we can express real wages as
Consider …rst a closed economy, with jj = 1. A larger population increases welfare with an elasticity of 1= ( 1). This is the standard result in models with love of variety and no heterogeneity, but di¤ers from the results in Chaney (2007), EKK, and Arkolakis (2006) , where this elasticity is 1=( 1) 1= . The reason why curvature does not a¤ect the gains from size in our set-up is that the number of goods (N j ) produced by an economy increases proportionately with L j . Thus, contrary to models with no free entry, consumers in a country with larger population are not forced to consume varieties produced with lower productivities.
On the other hand, a decline in the …xed cost of operation, f jj , increases welfare with elasticity 1=( 1) 1= . Here we see how curvature decreases the variety gains associated with love 13 Chaney (2007) essentially dispenses of the free entry condition this way. In his model some …rms may still not operate since they have low productivity.
14 Notice that the analysis in this section does not depend on the assumptions of free entry and symmetry across countries, but only on Dixit Stiglitz demand, CRS production technology and Pareto distribution of productivities.
of variety. A decline in f e , on the other hand, increases welfare with elasticity 1= -higher curvature entails a higher elasticity. The reason for this is that a lower f e leads to more entry while the number of operating …rms remains the same. This entails more selection, the bene…ts of which are increasing with heterogeneity, or 1= .
Trade costs, ij , and marketing costs, f ij , a¤ect real wages only indirectly through jj .
Thus, we can think of the welfare e¤ects of trade liberalization as a reduction in jj . In fact, in a proper calibration exercise, looking at the e¤ects of trade liberalization involves matching jj before and after the trade liberalization. In this model, jj in ‡uences welfare with an elasticity of 1= , exactly the same way as in Eaton and Kortum's (2002) model of pure Ricardian trade (with no variety) and also the same as in Chaney (2007) and Arkolakis (2006) . It is important to note that this happens even if f ij 6 = f jj , so that changes in jj do a¤ect total variety. To understand this, consider the case with f ij < f jj , so that an increase in ij (with a corresponding decline in jj ) increases total variety. Given f ij < f jj , the varieties that enter from abroad have prices that are higher than the domestic ones that are displaced, and it turns out that this exactly compensates the gains associated with increased variety.
This result implies that, conditional on the change in jj and given a value for , a model . Again, conditional on the change in ii , and noting that the relevant elasticity estimated in this model is 1 rather than , then the gains from trade are the same. Common country-product pairs 2.829 1.904
All / Common 1.014 1.000
Feenstra Ratio with σ = 6 0.997 1.000
